Bangkok’s stock market roared back 26% after three brutal years, but one giant stock drove the charge. Delta towers over the SET as Thai Airways plunged from ฿15.20 to ฿ 5.70, while foreign cash can still flee at the first sign of global danger and higher US interest rates this year.
Thailand’s stock market has roared back 26% in 2026 after three punishing years of losses, scandals and foreign flight. Yet the recovery remains dangerously narrow. The SET still trails its 2022 close, while Delta Electronics now controls an extraordinary share of the benchmark. Its ฿3.106 trillion valuation can lift or sink the national index almost single-handedly. Meanwhile, returning foreign funds, institutional buying and short covering have driven turnover sharply higher. However, war and soaring energy costs have already triggered another foreign retreat. Thai Airways offers an equally stark warning. Its profitable rehabilitation sent shares to ฿15.20 before released creditor holdings helped drive them down to ฿5.70. Bangkok’s market has escaped its 2025 depths, but weak breadth, restricted share supplies and extreme concentration leave the headline comeback far stronger than the market underneath.
Thailand’s stock market has staged a powerful but sharply uneven comeback during 2026. The Stock Exchange of Thailand Index closed at 1,588.68 points on September 1. That represented an increase of approximately 26% since December 2025. However, the benchmark remained below its closing level from 2022. The recovery also depended heavily upon one extraordinarily influential technology company.
The SET ended 2022 at 1,668.66 points. Therefore, the September 1 close remained approximately 4.8% below that level. The remaining gap appears modest after three years of sustained losses. Yet the headline figure conceals severe differences between companies and industries. Many smaller shares have not matched the benchmark’s powerful rise.
Three years of losses, scandals and foreign selling drove Thailand’s stock market into a confidence crisis
The market’s prolonged retreat began during 2023. The SET fell 15.2% and closed at 1,415.85 points. Subsequently, it lost another 1.1% during 2024, ending near 1,400 points. Then the decline accelerated during 2025. The index fell another 10% and closed at 1,259.67 points.
At its 2025 low, the SET reached only 1,053.79 points. That represented a decline approaching 37% from December 2022. Altogether, Thailand recorded three consecutive negative market years. Meanwhile, repeated corporate scandals severely damaged investor confidence. Questions spread across financial reporting, company governance and market supervision.
Foreign investors led the sustained withdrawal. They sold a net ฿192.08 billion of Thai shares during 2023. Further selling followed throughout 2024. Another ฿107.1 billion left the market during 2025. Consequently, liquidity tightened while share prices and market valuations collapsed.
Average daily turnover also fell sharply. Combined SET and Market for Alternative Investment turnover reached only ฿41.41 billion during 2025. In particular, smaller listed companies suffered from increasingly thin trading. Weak valuations restricted their ability to raise fresh equity. Existing shareholders also faced difficulty selling already depressed shares.
At the same time, Thai investors transferred more capital into overseas markets. Falling domestic share values weakened household wealth and discouraged participation. Businesses encountered a less receptive market for new capital. Furthermore, governance scandals raised doubts about company accounts and enforcement. Confidence in Bangkok’s financial marketplace deteriorated accordingly.
Trading curbs steadied the market as Bangkok’s crisis stopped short of threatening the banking system
By early 2025, Thailand’s poor performance had become internationally conspicuous. The SET briefly became the world’s worst-performing major market during the first quarter. Soon afterwards, American tariff announcements triggered another bout of global selling. Thailand’s already battered shares came under renewed pressure. In response, the exchange tightened several trading controls.
Temporary measures included narrower price limits and dynamic trading bands. The exchange also strengthened short-selling restrictions. Even so, the turmoil never became another 1997-style financial emergency. Thai banks remained adequately capitalised throughout the decline. Deposits, payment systems and bank funding continued operating normally.
Thus, the crisis remained concentrated in equities, liquidity and confidence. It did not threaten the banking system’s immediate survival. Nevertheless, prolonged market weakness carried serious economic consequences. Falling prices restricted corporate fundraising and reduced investor wealth. The scandals also damaged Thailand’s standing among international funds.
The Pheu Thai-led government began restoration efforts after taking power in 2023. Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin supported changes covering confidence and market supervision. As part of this, Asadej Kongsiri became SET President during 2024. His appointment came amid intense pressure on Bangkok’s financial centre. Despite those efforts, the market continued falling during 2025.
Anutin continues market reforms as foreign investors return and large dividend shares lead the recovery
Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s government has carried the programme forward. The government has pursued legislative reforms covering oversight and investor confidence. On another front, regulators have continued working against manipulation and governance failures. Still, rising index levels cannot alone repair the damage. Smaller companies remain vulnerable to poor liquidity and lingering distrust.
The 2026 recovery developed through several separate channels. First, foreign investors returned after three years of sustained market underperformance. They purchased approximately ฿27 billion of Thai shares during the first half. June alone produced around ฿7 billion of net foreign buying. Accordingly, fresh demand entered a market where many sellers had already withdrawn.
International funds also shifted some capital away from expensive American equities. Asian and emerging markets received greater attention. Thailand entered 2026 as a deeply depressed market with significant recovery potential. Initially, greater political stability following the election supported institutional buying. A stronger baht also improved foreign returns measured in dollars.
Meanwhile, lower Thai interest rates increased the attraction of dividend-paying equities. Banks, energy companies, retailers and technology groups provided liquid entry points. Notably, large banks offered relatively modest valuations and substantial dividends. They also held strong capital positions. Improving investment and loan expectations supplied additional support.
Local institutions and short covering accelerate the rally as turnover rebounds from depressed levels
In parallel, Thai institutional investors joined the early rally. Lower deposit and bond yields encouraged pension funds, insurers and mutual funds towards equities. Large companies with established cash flows received the strongest interest. By comparison, many smaller companies remained overlooked. Heavy household debt also continued restraining domestic consumption.
Short covering delivered another powerful boost. Thailand had become deeply unpopular among international investors during the three-year slide. Many traders held short positions against shares or index futures. Once expectations improved, they needed to buy those positions back. As a result, prices advanced faster than the underlying economy.
Crucially, earlier declines had already reduced normal trading activity. Even modest demand could therefore produce unusually large price movements. By June 2026, average daily turnover reached approximately ฿74.44 billion. That was 87.7% above the level recorded during June 2025. Nonetheless, turnover cannot be treated as permanent new capital.
Every transaction includes both a buyer and a seller. Moreover, the same funds can trade repeatedly during one session. High turnover does not prove equivalent capital entered Thailand permanently. Foreign investors generate more than half of trading value. Yet they neither own half the market nor supply half its new money.
Limited liquidity magnifies returning foreign demand before war as energy prices trigger retreat
Indeed, first-half foreign buying remained modest despite the increase in market capitalisation. Prices also climbed because reluctant sellers withdrew. Limited liquidity then magnified the effect of returning demand. Earlier, the same mechanism had intensified market losses. During 2026, it worked forcefully in the opposite direction.
The foreign return was neither steady nor secure. The Iran conflict exposed that weakness during March. Foreign investors sold approximately $823 million of Thai equities that month. Separately, they withdrew around $705 million from Thai bonds. The reversal followed a sharp increase in international energy prices.
Thailand imports substantial quantities of Middle Eastern oil and gas. Hence, the conflict threatened company costs, inflation and household spending. Airlines faced especially severe pressure from rising jet-fuel prices. International investors quickly reduced exposure to Thailand. The episode demonstrated how rapidly foreign capital could leave.
Against this background, Thai Airways International returned to SET trading on August 4, 2025. The national carrier’s relisting became a major market event. Thai Airways had entered bankruptcy-protected rehabilitation during 2020. Its shares remained suspended for almost five years. During that period, the company underwent one of Thailand’s largest corporate restructurings.
Thai Airways slashed debt, staffing and costs before its restricted shares surged on returning to the SET
Thai Airways had recorded persistent losses before the pandemic. Low-cost airlines steadily weakened its position, particularly on shorter regional routes. Then international aviation virtually stopped during the pandemic. Consequently, Thai Airways entered court-supervised rehabilitation with debts near ฿400 billion. Its survival required extensive financial and operating changes.
During rehabilitation, the airline reduced its workforce by approximately half. It also trimmed its fleet and removed substantial operating costs. Additionally, creditors converted large debt claims into shares. New capital was raised at ฿4.48 per share before relisting. The restructuring eventually reduced debt obligations to approximately ฿190 billion.
The Central Bankruptcy Court ended the rehabilitation process in June 2025. Thai Airways then prepared to resume trading under controlled selling conditions. On August 4, THAI opened at ฿10.50. That was more than double the capital-increase price. During the initial excitement, the stock subsequently reached ฿15.20.
At ฿15.20, Thai Airways was worth approximately ฿430.2 billion. At ฿10.50, it was valued near ฿297.2 billion. However, only a small proportion of its enlarged capital could trade freely. Government, creditor, employee and management holdings remained restricted. Consequently, limited supply amplified the opening rally.
Thai Airways’ enlarged capital and released creditor shares drive the stock far below its relisting peak
Thai Airways emerged from rehabilitation with approximately 28.303 billion shares. Accordingly, even modest share prices produced an enormous market valuation. At ฿7, the airline was still worth approximately ฿198.1 billion. The opening quotation did not reflect unrestricted trading across the shareholder base. Instead, strong demand pursued an unusually limited supply.
Gradually, investors examined the enlarged capital structure more closely. The shares declined as the relisting frenzy faded. Part of the restricted stock became eligible for sale during February 2026. A much larger supply overhang approached during August. Large creditor holdings then reached the end of their principal restrictions.
Not every shareholder immediately sold. The Ministry of Finance was unlikely to abandon its strategic position. By contrast, rehabilitation creditors held different objectives from ordinary long-term investors. Many had received shares through debt conversion. Some sought repayment rather than permanent airline ownership.
For that reason, every rebound faced the threat of renewed creditor sales. By September 1, THAI traded at ฿5.70. That placed it 45.7% below its first-day closing price. More dramatically, it stood 62.5% below its ฿15.20 high. Billions of baht had disappeared from the airline’s quoted value.
Thai Airways’ business recovery outpaces its battered share price as revenue, profit and cash strengthen
At ฿5.70, Thai Airways was worth approximately ฿161.3 billion. Investors subscribing at ฿4.48 remained roughly 27% ahead before dividends and costs. Their position differed sharply from that of investors buying during the relisting surge. Thus, the market return produced both substantial gains and deep losses. Timing determined each investor’s outcome.
The airline’s corporate recovery remained considerably stronger than its share chart. For 2025, revenue excluding one-time items reached ฿190.277 billion. That represented annual growth of 1.2%. It also exceeded the company’s 2019 pre-pandemic revenue. Passenger revenue increased by 0.5%.
Earnings before interest and tax reached ฿40.839 billion. Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation reached ฿53.880 billion. Thai Airways reported a net profit of ฿30.940 billion. Earnings reached ฿1.09 per share. Furthermore, cash and near-cash assets stood at ฿123.560 billion.
Liabilities fell 7.6% to ฿228.147 billion. Shareholders’ equity increased to ฿75.912 billion. Passenger numbers rose 2% to 16.46 million. Likewise, the average cabin factor improved from 78.8% to 79.2%. The airline subsequently resumed dividend payments following rehabilitation.
Rising fuel costs crush Thai Airways’ quarterly profit despite revenue, fares and passenger yields
Shareholders received ฿0.21 per share for the 2025 financial year. At ฿5.70, that represented a historical yield near 3.7%. Still, the board retained most earnings for liquidity and investment. Fleet expansion required substantial capital. Heavy finance costs also continued absorbing operating profits.
Conditions deteriorated sharply during the second quarter of 2026. The Middle East conflict sent jet-fuel prices dramatically higher. Average fuel prices increased 104.6% from the corresponding quarter. Consequently, operating expenses soared despite higher fares and fuel surcharges. War-related disruption also reduced flights and passenger demand.
Second-quarter revenue excluding one-time items reached ฿48.621 billion. That represented annual growth of 8.5%. Conversely, expenses excluding one-time items jumped 29.7% to ฿44.930 billion. The higher cost base consumed most additional revenue. Thai Airways increased average passenger yields by 20.3%.
Nevertheless, quarterly net profit fell to ฿1.537 billion. It had reached ฿12.134 billion during the corresponding 2025 quarter. Quarterly earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation stood at ฿8.182 billion. Meanwhile, the cabin factor dropped from 77% to 71.5%. Available seat kilometres also fell 4.4%.
Thai Airways expands the fleet and remains profitable as war, fuel prices and finance costs squeeze margins
Revenue passenger kilometres declined even faster, dropping 11.3%. For the first half, revenue excluding one-time items reached ฿99.650 billion. That represented annual growth of 3.3%. On the other hand, expenses rose 14.4%. Finance costs reached ฿6.152 billion during the period.
Thai Airways still recorded a first-half net profit of ฿11.645 billion. It also held ฿123.757 billion in cash and other current financial assets. By June, its fleet had expanded to 84 aircraft. Even so, war, fuel prices and finance costs remained serious threats. The company’s margins continued to face strong external pressure.
During the first half, Thai Airways received five Airbus A321neo aircraft. It also added three Boeing 787-8s and one Boeing 787-9. These aircraft strengthened future capacity and route expansion. At the same time, they increased long-term investment requirements. The business recovery remained genuine, but its exposure remained severe.
Thai Airways therefore provides a stark warning from Thailand’s recovering market. A sound corporate turnaround did not prevent a heavy share-price correction. Restricted supply initially pushed the price far above the subscription level. Later share releases placed sustained pressure on the quotation. Operating success and investment performance moved in opposite directions.
Delta’s extraordinary market value gives one technology firm immense power over the Thai index
Delta Electronics Thailand now creates a far larger index problem. The technology company rose approximately 76% during the early 2026 rally. By August 31, Delta traded at ฿249. Its market capitalisation reached approximately ฿3.106 trillion. That equalled roughly 15.5% of the SET’s entire ฿20.04 trillion value.
At earlier stages, Delta approached one-fifth of the benchmark. Consequently, one company supplied a disproportionate share of the SET’s recovery. Its movements can overpower hundreds of other listed businesses. A rising Delta can mask widespread weakness. Likewise, a sharp correction can drag down the entire market measure.
A 5% Delta increase can add approximately 0.8% to the SET. A 10% rise can add roughly 1.6%. In contrast, a 10% fall can remove approximately 1.6%. At 1,590 points, that equals around 25 index points. These calculations exclude changes across every other listed company.
A 25% Delta correction could directly remove about 3.9% from the benchmark. A 50% collapse could strip approximately 7.8%. For this purpose, Delta’s market price has become a national index issue. Its influence extends far beyond its shareholders. Its movements shape perceptions of Thailand’s entire equity market.
Delta Thailand is not a hollow speculative business. It manufactures advanced power-management equipment and electronic components. Its products support servers, data centres and telecommunications networks. The company also supplies electric vehicles, industrial automation and renewable-energy systems. Additionally, it produces cooling and thermal-management equipment.
Delta’s global technology operations, tight ownership and low free float amplify every share movement
These products are essential for power-intensive artificial-intelligence infrastructure. Modern servers require sophisticated power conversion, backup systems and heat management. Delta operates across each area. As a consequence, investors treat it as a major artificial-intelligence and data-centre play. International technology spending has driven rapid revenue growth.
The company was incorporated in Thailand in 1988. It joined the SET in 1995. Its main Thai factory operates at Bangpoo Industrial Estate in Samut Prakan. However, Delta is not a purely domestic manufacturer. It forms part of the wider Taiwan-based Delta Electronics group.
Its international operations span Asia, Europe, Australia and the Americas. Three disclosed Delta companies directly control at least 63.78% of the Thai-listed business. Delta Electronics International Singapore holds 42.85%. Delta International Holding Limited owns another 15.39%. Delta Electronics Incorporated controls 5.54%.
Large nominee accounts hold further substantial positions. However, nominee records do not identify their ultimate investors. Those holdings cannot automatically be attributed to Delta’s parent group. Notably, foreign investors controlled 92.32% of the company by August 31. Its declared free float stood at only 23.98%.
As a result, most Delta shares remain unavailable for normal public trading. Restricted supply sharply increases price sensitivity. Relatively small purchases can alter the value of a ฿3.1 trillion company. The same mechanism applies during intense selling. Each large movement then feeds directly into the SET Index.
Delta delivers sales and profit growth but its extreme valuation demands years of exceptional results
Delta’s financial performance supports part of the excitement. Revenue reached $6.026 billion during 2025 after growing 30.9%. Net profit reached approximately $754 million. Second-quarter 2026 revenue then climbed 50.7% to $2.011 billion. Quarterly net profit increased 33.4% annually to $186 million.
Despite that annual growth, profit fell 35% from the exceptional first quarter. Raw-material shortages, higher costs and inventory provisions weakened margins. Hence, extraordinary sales growth did not deliver uninterrupted profit growth. The company remained highly profitable and rapidly expanding. Investors had already priced in many years of exceptional results.
At ฿249, Delta traded at approximately 104 times annual earnings. Its price-to-book ratio reached 29.46 times. Enterprise value stood near 70 times earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. Over the preceding year, its shares traded between ฿141 and ฿372. That range demonstrated extraordinary volatility.
A price-to-earnings ratio above 100 places enormous demands upon future performance. Investors pay more than ฿100 for every ฿1 of annual profit. Consequently, even strong growth may not satisfy expectations. Delta must repeatedly exceed already aggressive forecasts. Any disappointment could trigger a major valuation correction.
Passive funds and Delta’s limited free float can intensify both rallies and corrections across SET indices
Importantly, Delta does not need to fail for its shares to collapse. A valuation reduction from 104 to 60 times earnings could erase over 40%. That could happen without any decline in profits. The company might continue growing while its share price falls heavily. Company quality and investment value therefore remain separate matters.
Passive investment funds can intensify these movements. Funds tracking SET indices must adjust holdings when company weightings change. First, Delta’s price rises and its benchmark weight increases. Next, index-linked funds require additional Delta shares. Those purchases can support another rise and tighten supply further.
In reverse, falling prices reduce index weightings and can generate additional sales. Limited free float then intensifies the drop. Under those conditions, a correction could gather force without collapsing operations. The resulting SET fall could appear broader than the actual corporate damage. Market structure would magnify the financial headlines.
The SET introduced a 10% constituent cap for the SET50 and SET100. The limit is reset quarterly. It also applies to free-float versions of those indices. In comparison, the broad headline SET Index remains weighted by full market capitalisation. It gives Delta influence based upon every outstanding share.
Delta’s enormous benchmark power conceals weaker domestic shares as the broader SET loses market balance
Only approximately 24% of Delta shares form its declared free float. This creates a stark mismatch between tradable supply and benchmark power. Remarkably, the capped SET50 can provide a more balanced measure than the broader SET. The national benchmark remains heavily exposed to Delta’s quoted valuation. That exposure distorts daily readings of market health.
Delta’s ascent can also conceal weakness across Thailand’s domestic economy. Its earnings depend heavily upon overseas customers and international technology investment. A Thai retailer can struggle while Delta rises. Property developers and smaller manufacturers can remain depressed during the same session. The SET can therefore climb without reflecting ordinary domestic conditions.
At approximately 1,590 points, the market is no longer a distressed bargain. It trades near 15.8 times reported earnings. Its price-to-book ratio stands around 1.48 times. Meanwhile, the dividend yield remains close to 4%. Selected banks, telecommunications companies, hospitals and utilities continue producing substantial cash.
Some companies also retain reliable dividends and sound balance sheets. Nonetheless, the broad SET has already climbed approximately 26% during 2026. Share prices have advanced faster than the wider economy. Household debt continues restricting consumption. Modest economic growth also limits the speed of corporate earnings improvement.
Energy, currency and political risks threaten a recovery already narrowed by Delta and weak market breadth
Thailand remains heavily exposed to imported energy. Middle East conflict can therefore raise costs across transport, manufacturing and household consumption. Elsewhere, a strong baht pressures exporters and parts of the tourism industry. Political disputes and court decisions can reverse confidence rapidly. Budget problems can produce another source of uncertainty.
Governance concerns among smaller listed companies have not disappeared. Nor has the problem of thin liquidity. Many ordinary shares did not participate fully in the 2026 rally. For that reason, the headline index exaggerates the recovery’s breadth. Delta’s exceptional rise has concealed a much weaker performance underneath.
The SET has recovered almost all its losses since December 2022. Even so, it remains below that closing level after three negative years. The recovery is genuine in price terms but rests upon a narrow foundation. Foreign money has returned and trading has improved. Selected banks and other large companies have also performed strongly.
Thai Airways offers one warning from this recovering marketplace. Its business emerged profitably from rehabilitation, but its shares collapsed after the initial frenzy. Delta presents a different and considerably larger danger. Its business is substantial, international and fast-growing. Its share-price valuation remains extraordinarily demanding.
Thai Airways and Delta expose supply risks as Thailand’s narrow stock market recovery faces a new test
Both cases demonstrate the force of restricted supply. Thai Airways surged while most rehabilitation shares remained locked. The price then fell as large tranches became tradable. Delta’s limited free float produces similar price sensitivity. However, its enormous index weight spreads that volatility across the entire SET.
Ultimately, Thailand’s exchange has climbed far from its 1,053.79-point low. Much of the easiest recovery has already occurred. International capital can also reverse direction rapidly, as the Iran conflict demonstrated.
Finance Minister orders urgent probe into confusion about stock market share transfers and reporting
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Meanwhile, Delta’s restricted free float magnifies every major transaction. Its valuation places the national benchmark under sustained concentration pressure.
Thailand’s stock market has escaped the depths reached during 2025. Confidence, liquidity and international interest have returned. Yet the SET’s headline strength conceals a far narrower recovery beneath the surface. The benchmark remains heavily dependent upon Delta’s extraordinary share price. Bangkok’s market has rebounded sharply, but its listed companies have not recovered equally.
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Further reading:
Finance Minister orders urgent probe into confusion about stock market share transfers and reporting
Officials zero in on ownership of expanding Chinese food delivery services operating in the kingdom
Huai Khwang raid shows nominee shareholdings being used by Chinese infiltrating the economy
Sweep of nominee firms and business networks on Koh Phangan. 22 arrested, 200 million in land seized
Anutin visits Koh Phangan as nominee crackdown shows 68% of firms with foreign ownership links
Blitzkrieg on foreign firms and enterprises on Koh Phangan continues with French owned resort busted
